Viet Lam: We cannot accept violence to change borders, and the world has generated a lot of international laws such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and even in ASEAN, we have the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the East Sea (DOC) to sign with China to respect the status quo. This presents many challenges that we have observed: how can we enforce and engage a power to abide by mutual shared commitments? They commit to obeying that, but they ignore in some cases.
Dr. Nguyen Hung Son: I think this is a tough question because for China, it is difficult to force them to do something unless they themselves realize that it is in their best interest to behave in that way.
For example, how to convince China that the UNCLOS is in their own interest to obey. It is because the Chinese economic boom or miracle has been based on booming global trade.
Booming global trade would not have happened if the sea was in chaos, if the law of the sea was not respected by countries and if there was no freedom of navigation, for example. So, China has to realize that it is in their long-term national interest to preserve freedom of navigation, to preserve order at sea and to keep the current rule-based order in the sea, for it is going to benefit them in the long run.
If China realizes that, China would be a force to protect the Law of the Sea rather than undertaking activities that would undermine the whole regime. I think that is the way we should approach China.
I believe that China does not think with one mind. There are people in China, who really understand the Law of the Sea, who really understand and see China’s national interest in its full integration with the international community.
However, there are other groups of interest, for example, the hawkish people who might pursue their own selfish group interests rather than national interests. They are playing their short-term game, making games of their groups at the expense of national image and interests. We have to point China towards that and as soon as China realizes that, I believe, China will behave differently.
Prof. Bindenagel: I think that is a really good example of what we have just said. It is a chance for diplomacy after all. Diplomacy is to identify those interests and align those interests so that you have the right outcome. So, if you think about it in terms of economic prosperity or miracle as you called it after Deng Xiaoping.
The important element in that was the accession of China into the WTO. Those are rules that if you look inside, the debate has been about the piracy of intellectual property for a long time. At some point, there will be enough intellectual property in China that those who are pirating say that no, we cannot do this anymore, and the Chinese Government will be able to say we have to follow those rules.
This is the dynamic that I see that we have to work together to achieve. So, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a very important element because if the TPP and in a larger sense trans-Atlantic trade and investment partnership come together, those are rules that create a trans-Atlantic alone of 800 million consumers and if you add the TPP, the number you have, there is much more for the prosperity of China. That means it is in their interest.
And try to define those interests and then relate them to other things, the sea lane is critical in this issue. You have the economic relationship in trans-Pacific and trans-Atlantic, the WTO. And those interests are challenged because of what happening in the sea lane that leads to 60-80% of the world trade and or the energy issues that translate into the trade, then you have a way to talk about what are your interests and how we should relate them to the law of some of the territorial issues, sea issues in a peaceful way.
So I think you are absolutely right. How do we do that in diplomacy? That is the challenge of what you said. What structure do we need? I think we can be creative. That is what the Boston Global Forum has just asked us to do, to think through what some of the options are, what kind of framework. These are some of the elements of the framework where you shift interests to the right outcome. But you need transparency, you need to understand calculation, where you come from, to dismiss those things that are ideologically based or nationalistically based.
Whatever they are that need to do, there is nothing wrong to talk about interest. Interest is very important and how they relate to your principles. If you can align your interest with principles, you can have the basis for the structure around them.
Viet Lam: Which forum could be appropriate to discuss those things because one reader’s question is that with some incidents in the East Sea, it shows that the ASEAN has failed the test to show their unity and resolve in dealing with China. So ASEAN and its mechanism are still appropriate to deal with China?
Prof. Bindenagel: I think the structure is not developed enough. On the other hand, I would not reject it at all. I would say you have to go back to ASEAN and have the conversation and push the conversations.
The Asia Summit is another because it is a larger group. Beyond that, you can do bilateral. There are a lot of things you can do bilaterally in the context of multilateral.
Dr. Do Hung Son and Prof. James Dale Bindenagel.
We can make the point that some provocative issues cross that line and so we can do that, but also you all can do that in terms of where the line is, so that we can have over time. Hopefully we will not have a crisis but over time we can build understanding and openness that allow ASEAN to take other steps that we have not taken before.
Dr. Nguyen Hong Son: I can understand why there are those critics on ASEAN and that is because there is too much expectation about ASEAN.
Just imagine how it would be without ASEAN, where would you discuss DOC, where would you promote maritime security in Southeast Asia. It is in those ASEAN-led mechanisms where you discuss or where diplomacy happens.
Given that diplomacy is so important to avoid miscalculation and to promote cooperation, where would those things happen, the mechanism that ASEAN created? So, I do not discount the fact that ASEAN has not been able to prevent some incidents, but after each and every incident, ASEAN learns something and ASEAN makes progress.
Take the oil rig incident, for example. ASEAN has made the strongest statement in 20 years in criticizing China about the incident. So that is huge progress by ASEAN. And not only as a group, individual ASEAN countries have made further their policy on the South China Sea on how to become a more active player on contributing to securing peace in the South China Sea, and this was not just the claimant countries.
The non claimant countries are also contributing to the process as well. Take Thailand and Myanmar, for example. They are non claimant in the East Sea; however, they have contributed hugely to encouraging ASEAN to come up with a single statement, single voice towards China on the issue. So you have to see that there is nothing is going to happen to ASEAN overnight. You have to be patient in ASEAN. Give ASEAN time and it will deliver.
Prof. Bindenagel: I understand that and am very much in favor of that because it is in the American interest to be in the region, but it is also our interest to have issues resolved. And if not resolved as the structure you can manage so government or business are managing issues with diplomacy, to try to think ahead and try to understand how to change things in a positive way. But I want to add one more word of discussion that diplomacy without arms is like an orchestra without instruments.
We have to be realistic that as we watch our diplomacy and the Chinese and your own diplomacy that is not backed with a series of military possibility. I am not arguing that to be used, but you have to have the ability to enforce. Do not use it for diplomacy to know when it is impossible, not useful to go down their path if you do not have both.
Viet Lam: Some scholars in Boston Global Forum video said it is more important that the U.S. support individual countries to deal with pressure from China? Do you agree with that point?
Prof. Bindenagel: No, I do not agree. I think it is important that individual countries deal with China because it is very important bilaterally. In the case of Vietnam and China, it is very important that you have various levels, government levels, and you have bilateral discussions to make sure that you will not make miscalculation. But in the longer term, it is really important in the next level, people are dealing with in the Diplomatic Academy or in businesses, in military.
Some structures come together with the Chinese and Vietnamese where people of that level were not responsible for their own organization but for part of their organization, they come together and discuss the narrative, the possible and the results. This conversation you can see what the results are if it fails, it goes directly to conflicts.
That is a scenario. There are other scenarios, Vietnam and China at that level, not the government but think tank level if they will, they can come together as a group and talk about what the scenarios are so that you can talk about what is possible, what the outcome could be, and then you can argue whether it is possible or not. That is what you want to start so that you can have this.
I was a negotiator for conflict diamonds in which the Business Community has 4% in its diamond trade and the advocacy groups want to destroy the industry and they nearly did. But in the end, they came together and discussed the best outcome we could have.
They suggested then a certificate of origin to control diamonds and the government was just brought in. And we made an agreement and in that case, conflict diamonds were reduced, and almost eliminated from the market. So you can have bilateral discussions among interest groups, you can connect. That is a concept that I think is very useful pursued on a bilateral basis.
I do not think that countries can negotiate bilaterally with China and be successful to inherent differences in power positions. You need to do bilateral and you need to do multilateral. But not alliance, as you were suggesting that we have an alliance against China.
As I said at the outset, the U.S. and Vietnam are not going to make an alliance against China. That does not work. But we can do lots of other things that we have been discussing here.
Dr. Nguyen Hong Son: I could agree more with Prof. Bindenagel that there is no single framework for which we can solve everything. I think the structure which the Ambassador pointed out again and again.
And what in this region we call it regional security architecture or regional architecture should involve as many bilateral, multilateral, multilateral mechanism as possible would serve and cater to different groups of kinds of stakeholders and come in different forms, whether the official track or informal tracks as long as they serve to help clear ambiguity, establish a clear vision and make perceptions among the stakeholders become clear, which is going to be helpful for the region and it is going to contribute to a better outcome.
That is why ASEAN as an important regional stakeholder has been encouraging a multilayer framework, which has created many multilateral processes whereby the memberships are different, the purposes are different which sometimes are criticized as being too much overlapping.
However, in the ASEAN view, those mechanisms, despite overlapping, are still helpful. And it does serve the interests of various countries in the region and help stabilize a very strategically unstable region.
Viet Lam: A question for Dr. Son from a reader. In dealing with the China’s rise, we observe that small and middle powers have adjusted their foreign policy and maneuvered for balance and advantage. What about Vietnam?
Dr. Nguyen Hong Son: I have to say that small does not necessarily mean weak and big does not necessarily mean powerful.
Being as big as China,.but it does not mean that China is very strong. There are various ways that China is having a lot of internal problems and in a way, China has many weaknesses. And Vietnam, despite being small, it does not have to be weak. It can exert its soft power.
Look at Singapore, they are such a small country, but nobody says that they are weak politically. They exert their power beyond their punching weight, as they usually call it. So, Vietnam can be strong in the international and influential in international relations, if it knows how to exert its power.
So, what is the option for Vietnam? I think Vietnam’s option is to be with the international community and to be protected by the international community. That means that we have to be fully integrated and cooperative with the international community.
We should support the rules of the game that the international community endorses and that is international law. So we should work to support the implementation of international law.
We should work to clarify and interpret international laws in our context of the East Sea, and help that same interpretation adopted by all countries in the region, including China.
We should work with ASEAN countries because it is our home organization.
We should make ASEAN strong and have a strong voice in international relations. And if ASEAN can influence international relations in our part of the world, then Vietnam is going to have a better role and influence too.
That is the way that Vietnam as a middle or small power should do in an age where it is perceived that major powers are increasingly at play.
Prof. Bindenagel: I like that description. I think there are levels of bilateral, multilateral. Take one step beyond that, from the global aspect, you got the Trans-Pacific Partnership we talked about, the WTO, just in their areas alone, those roles that you should play are really important because that is what the rules that we set on, not just on the military side.
On the security side, it is really critical, but in my view, it is a way to prevent and to resolve conflict through diplomacy and through diplomacy with such institutions we have just talked about, ASEAN in particular, bilateral relations, and WTO and Trans-Pacific Partnership.
Those are difficult issues for Vietnam. That means, changing elements of the economy, listening to global consumers to know what their demands are. Make sure that the risks in the supply chain that you participate in are resolved.
Whatever position Vietnam finds itself, that its own brand and name is one of high quality, reliability and security. So you present yourself in that way globally, not just in the region. And I think you will do it well.
